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Introduction 
 
As with so many other aspects of life, the impact of the Coronavirus on social care has 
been devastating. Social care is a system, providing daily living assistance to disabled 
and elderly people in residential and domiciliary contexts,1 that was already over-
stretched and struggling to secure the dignity of its users in a context of increasing 
need.2 Its funding settlement has been very much debated, but was still unresolved 
following the last general election.3 Put bluntly, a pandemic was the last thing that 
social care needed. 
The Government reacted in a number of ways to the impact of COVID-19 on 
social care in England. In mid-May 2020 the Prime Minister announced £600m of extra 
funding for infection control in care homes.4 This, however, was in a context of alleged 
	
* This paper draws on a presentation given by the author during a webinar on “Disability in the Context 
of the Coronavirus Pandemic” organised by the Bonavero Institute of Human Rights and the Oxford 
Disability Law and Policy Project in May 2020. The author is grateful for comments received from 
attendees and the anonymous reviewer, but remains responsible for all errors. 
1 Commission on Funding of Care and Support, Fairer Care Funding: The Report of the Commission on 
Funding of Care and Support (London: Crown, 2011) p.4 
2 See, e.g., B. Sloan, “Formal and Informal Care in the Public and Private Spheres in England and 
Australia” in L. Gelsthorpe, P. Mody and B. Sloan (eds), Spaces of Care (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2020). 
3 See, e.g., B. Sloan, “The ‘Social Contract’, Care and Inheritance in England and Hong Kong” (2020) 
50 Kong Kong Law Journal 139. 
4 Gov.uk, “Press release: Care home support package backed by £600 million to help reduce coronavirus 
infections”, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/care-home-support-package-backed-by-
600-million-to-help-reduce-coronavirus-infections?utm_source=d2ca92cd-6d5b-4d5d-b64e-
a8a48ec30893&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=govuk-notifications&utm_content=immediate 
[Accessed 24 August 2020].  
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previous downplaying of the risks of infection in such homes5 (albeit that the Prime 
Minister controversially criticised care homes themselves for not following appropriate 
procedures),6 high but uncertain mortality rates nevertheless7 and at least initial 
shortages of personal protective equipment and testing, leading to a situation whereby 
“social care felt abandoned”.8 The Government also engaged in a somewhat superficial 
“rebranding” of social care,9 But countless issues inevitably remained, not the least of 
which was how to ensure both continuity and safety of social care provided in the homes 
of disabled people.10 
A concrete legal reaction, however, was to “ease” the social care duties owed 
by local authorities under the Care Act 2014 in response to the pandemic. This short 
paper will outline some of the so-called “easements” in the Coronavirus Act 2020, 
critiquing the 2020 Act’s purported reliance on the European Convention on Human 
Rights as a means of ensuring a minimum level of protection for adult social care users. 
It will do so inter alia with reference to the 2020 Act’s similar but distinct “easements” 
of the Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014.11 It will then highlight the 
significance of guidance and policy in determining the practical effect of the provisions. 
	
5 Full Fact, “Government guidance withdrawn in March did say it was ‘very unlikely’ people in care 
homes would be infected with Covid-19”, 13 May 2020, available at 
https://fullfact.org/health/coronavirus-care-homes-guidance/ [Accessed 24 August 2020]. 
6 B. Butcher, “Coronavirus: What guidance did care homes get from the government?”, BBC News, 7 
July 2020, available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/52674073 [Accessed 24 August 2020]. 
7 Office for National Statistics, “Deaths involving COVID-19 in the care sector, England and Wales: 
deaths occurring up to 12 June 2020 and registered up to 20 June 2020 (provisional)” (2020).  
8 House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, Readying the NHS and social care for the COVID-
19 peak (H.C. 405, 2020).  
9 V. Wood, “Coronavirus: Matt Hancock ridiculed after announcing badge to support care sector 
workers”, The Independent, 16 April 2020, available at 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/coronavirus-matt-hancock-social-care-worker-badge-
nhs-of-all-the-things-that-longsuffering-social-a9467631.html [Accessed 24 August 2020]. 
10 See, e.g., H. Low, “How disabled people are problem-solving in the pandemic”, BBC News, 19 May 
2020, available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/disability-52369053 [Accessed 24 August 2020].  
11 Cf Coronavirus Act 2020, ss. 16-17, “easing” duties relating to assessment of needs only in Scotland; 
cf also Department of Health and Social Care, “Adult Social Care Covid-19 Forum – weekly 
teleconferences: 08/04/2020, 13:00-14:00: ‘Care Act Easements’”, available at 
https://www.local.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/Care%20Act%20Easements%20-
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The “Easements” of the Care Act Duties 
 
The legislation that became the Care Act 2014 was described as “the biggest change in 
the law governing … care and support in England since the National Assistance Act 
1948”.12 It is both striking and controversial that the 2014 Act’s duties, modest though 
they are, were attenuated almost exactly five years after their introduction, and at a time 
of crisis when demand obviously remained high and more informal sources of support 
for elderly and disabled people were potentially at risk.13 The name given for this 
process of attenuating a Care Act duty in the relevant statutory guidance is an 
“easement”.14 Traditionally, “easement” has been used as a technical term to describe 
a limited right enjoyed over someone else’s nearby land,15 and it seems odd to say the 
least that the word has been appropriated in this very different context. 
In any event, schedule 12 of the Coronavirus Act 2020, given effect by section 
15, lists a host of duties under of the Care Act (and related regulations) with which local 
authorities in England no longer have to comply. Similar provision is also made for 
Wales, as regards the Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014. Schedule 12 
came into force in England on 31 March 2020.16 Some of the “eased” duties are 
analysed in the following sub-sections. 
 
Assessing Needs 
 	
%20Webinar%20Readout%20and%20QA%20v3.pdf [Accessed 24 August 2020] p.22 on Northern 
Ireland. 
12 House of Lords & House of Commons Joint Committee on the Draft Care and Support Bill, Draft 
Care and Support Bill: Report (2012–13, HL 143, HC 822), para. 41. 
13 Cf, e.g., the original Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020 (SI 
2020/350), reg.6(1)(d). 
14 Department of Health & Social Care, “Care Act easements: guidance for local authorities”, updated 
20 May 2020, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/coronavirus-covid-19-changes-
to-the-care-act-2014/care-act-easements-guidance-for-local-authorities#steps-local-authorities-
should-take-before-exercising-the-care-act-easements [Accessed 24 August 2020]. 
15 See, e.g., B. McFarlane, N. Hopkins and S. Nield, Land Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2020), Ch.9. 
16 Coronavirus Act 2020 (Commencement No. 2) Regulations 2020 (SI 2020/388). 
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The Care Act duties disapplied by schedule 12 of the Coronavirus Act 2020 include 
those to assess an “adult” (i.e. a care recipient) or a carer’s need for care and/or 
support,17 including in cases of hospital discharge.18 There is no longer any legal 
requirement to determine whether someone’s needs are significant enough to reach the 
Act’s national eligibility threshold triggering an obligation to meet them,19 which will 
be discussed further in the next sub-section. It should be noted that the 2020 provisions 
do not actually prevent a local authority from choosing to carry out an assessment of 
needs.20 De facto considerations of needs will also be necessary in light of the continued 
obligation to meet needs. As explained in the next subsection, however, that obligation 
has itself been attenuated. Moreover, the specific obligation (for example) to consider 
“the outcomes that the adult wishes to achieve in day-to-day life” when assessing needs 
will not apply.21 The overall picture is one whereby local authorities’ discretion is 
increased. The reality is that before the 2020 Act, local authorities had considerable 
effective discretion about which needs to meet, despite the national eligibility 
threshold.22 Now they will have discretion over whether even formally to assess needs 
in the first place, and a number of duties in relation to formal care and support plans 
have also been removed.23 That said, the statutory guidance makes clear that a full needs 
assessment etc will have to take place when the so-called “emergency period” comes 
to an end.24 
 
The Meeting of Needs and the Limitations of Article 8 
 
It is now necessary to consider the actual meeting of needs following the 2020 Act. 
Schedule 12 expressly provides that a local authority’s duty to meet a need for care and 
support under the Care Act is limited to situations where “the authority considers that 	
17 Coronavirus Act 2020, sch.12, para.2(1)(a)-(b), disapplying duties under Care Act 2014, ss.9-10. 
18 Coronavirus Act 2020, sch.12, para.14, amending Care Act 2014, sch.3, para.3. 
19 Coronavirus Act 2020, sch.12, para.2(2), disapplying duties under Care Act 2014, s.13.  
20 See, e.g., Coronavirus Act 2020, sch.12, para. 2(4). 
21 Care Act 2014, s.9(4)(b). 
22 See, e.g., C. Slasberg and P. Beresford, “Government Guidance for the Care Act: Undermining 
Ambitions for Change?” (2014) 10 Disability & Society 1677. 
23 Coronavirus Act 2020, sch.12, para.11, disapplying duties under Care Act 2014, s.24 inter alia. 
24 Department of Health & Social Care, “Care Act easements: guidance for local authorities”, Section 4. 
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it is necessary to meet those needs for the purpose of avoiding a breach of the adult’s 
Convention rights”,25 meaning (European) Convention rights as defined by the Human 
Rights Act 1998.26 At first sight, this might provide some reassurance. It purports to 
ensure a minimum standard of protection for older and disabled people even in the 
present context, and even though the national eligibility threshold is being disapplied. 
That eligibility threshold amounted to a duty on local authorities to provide support 
where an adult has needs relating to an impairment or illness, as a result the adult is 
unable to achieve two or more specified outcomes without support, and the inability is 
at least likely to have a significant impact on the adult’s well-being.27 The relatively 
similar eligibility threshold for meeting the needs of informal carers is also disapplied 
by the 2020 Act, and equivalent provision on avoiding a breach of the carer’s 
Convention rights made.28  
In order to assess the implications of that threshold’s removal for adults in need 
of care and support, it is necessary to consider the impact or otherwise of the European 
Convention in the area of social care law. Relevant Convention rights would include 
the right to life under Article 2, the absolute right to be free from torture, or inhuman 
or degrading treatment under Article 3, and the qualified right to respect for private and 
family life under Article 8. It should be emphasised that there is also a power to meet 
needs even where doing so is not necessary to comply with a person’s Convention 
rights.29 The statutory guidance, moreover, emphasises that the 2020 Act “does not give 
authority to block, restrict or withdraw whole services”,30 and that relevant provisions 
of the Equality Act 2010 remain applicable.31 
Any optimism about the continued applicability of Convention rights, however, 
may need to be qualified for a number of reasons, and this paper will consider three. 
First, the 2020 Act appears to allow the authority itself to determine whether 
Convention rights would be breached if certain needs were not met. It does so by 	
25 Coronavirus Act 2020, sch.12, para.4, amending Care Act 2014, s.18. 
26 Coronavirus Act 2020, sch.12, para.4, amending Care Act 2014, s.18. 
27 Care Act 2014, s. 13; Care and Support (Eligibility Criteria) Regulations (SI 2015/313). 
28 Coronavirus Act 2020, sch.12, para.6, amending Care Act 2014, s.20. 
29 Coronavirus Act 2020, sch.12, para.5, leaving much of Care Act 2014, s.19 intact. 
30 Department of Health & Social Care, “Care Act easements: guidance for local authorities”, 
Introduction. 
31 Department of Health & Social Care, “Care Act easements: guidance for local authorities”, Section 4. 
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limiting the duty to the situation where “the authority considers that it is necessary to 
meet [relevant] needs for the purpose of avoiding a breach of the adult’s Convention 
rights”.32 The legal significance of this distinction is presumably limited, since a local 
authority as a “public authority” would remain bound by Convention rights as judicially 
and objectively determined through the Human Rights Act 1998.33 Its effect in practice 
may nevertheless be considerable in deterring challenges to local authority action or 
inaction. The very fact that a local authority would remain so bound by the Human 
Rights Act is a reminder of the limited effect of the retained duty in the 2020 Act. 
Secondly, the protection provided by the Convention is limited even in the 
absence of a pandemic. This is well illustrated by the pre-Care Act case of Elaine 
McDonald, who had her help to reach a commode at night withdrawn by Kensington 
and Chelsea Royal London Borough Council such that she was forced to rely on 
incontinence pads despite not being medically incontinent. The substance of the local 
authority’s decision in the case was held not to breach Ms McDonald’s right to respect 
for her private life under Article 8, either in the UK Supreme Court34 or in the European 
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.35 The European Court held that once the local 
authority formally adjusted its own assessment of Ms McDonald’s needs, the prima 
facie interference with Article 8(1) (which was not even recognised by the majority of 
the Supreme Court) became lawful and was necessary and proportionate for the 
purposes of Article 8(2). The decision illustrates the level of deference applicable to 
local authorities for the purposes of Article 8. There is even a suggestion from the Court 
of Appeal in Anufrijeva v Southwark London Borough Council,36 recognised in 
McDonald as “[t]he leading domestic case on the positive obligation to provide welfare 
	
32 Coronavirus Act 2020, sch.12, para.4, amending Care Act 2014, s.18 (emphasis added). 
33 Human Rights Act 1998, s.6. 
34 R (McDonald) v Kensington and Chelsea Royal London Borough Council [2011] UKSC 33; [2011] 4 
All E.R. 881. 
35 McDonald v United Kingdom (2015) 60 E.H.R.R. 1. For general discussion of the case at various levels 
see, e.g., H. Carr, “Rational Men and Difficult Women—R (on the application of McDonald) v Royal 
Borough of Kensington and Chelsea [2011] UKSC 33” (2012) 34 Journal of Social Welfare & Family 
Law 219; L. Pritchard-Jones, “Night-time Care, Article 8 and the European Court of Human Rights: A 
Missed Opportunity?” (2015) 37 Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law 108; B. Sloan, “Adult Social 
Care and Property Rights” (2016) 36 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 428. 
36 [2003] EWCA Civ 1406; [2004] Q.B. 1124.  
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support under article 8”,37 that a breach of Article 8 might not be found in this context 
unless it amounts to a breach of the right to be free from torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment for the purposes of Article 3, which carries a high threshold.38 This is true 
notwithstanding the Court of Appeal’s acceptance that matters may differ where there 
are children and/or a family unit involved. In McDonald, Lord Brown was clearly 
influenced by the width of the margin of appreciation afforded by the Strasbourg court 
in matters of state-provided services as he rather dismissively described the 
“hopelessness” of the claimant’s case on Article 8.39 Notwithstanding the very fact that 
Lord Brown and the majority in McDonald were deciding the case at a national rather 
than a supranational level, a domestic judge is likely to take a similar approach when 
faced with an Article 8-based complaint of inadequacy of social care provision during 
the period covered by schedule 12.  
It must be conceded that it is not clear that the national eligibility threshold 
would have helped Ms McDonald even if it had been available at the time. The 
threshold was designed to replicate in practice the previous “substantial” level of needs, 
defined in mere guidance,40 whereas Ms McDonald’s needs were at times described as 
“moderate” such that the “new” threshold was not designed to cover them. In any event, 
it was apparently permissible for the local authority to redefine Ms McDonald’s needs 
so that they related to her safety (and could be met through the provision of pads) rather 
than relating to the need to reach a commode per se. Local authorities realistically 
retained such powers of definition even after the 2014 Act was implemented. Somewhat 
paradoxically, this may reduce the significance of the fact that the threshold has been 
temporarily removed by the 2020 Act, with (only) Convention obligations left intact. It 
nevertheless remains clear that the purpose of the “easement” was to lessen the burden 
on local authorities. The fact that the duties to assess needs and to review plans41 have 
themselves been removed, moreover, in all likelihood serves only to increase the 
latitude allowed to local authorities in comparison to a situation like McDonald. 
	
37 [2011] UKSC 33 at [18]. 
38 See, e.g., Budina v Russia App no 45603/05 (ECtHR, 18 June 2009) (transcript) p.7. 
39 [2011] UKSC 33 at [16]. 
40 See, e.g., J.-L. Fernández, T. Snell and J. Marczak, “An Assessment of the Impact of the Care Act 
2014 Eligibility Regulations” (2015) PSSRU Discussion Paper DP2905. 
41 Coronavirus Act 2020, sch.12 para.11. 
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A third possible reason for pessimism was the risk that the UK Government 
would seek to derogate from the Convention on the basis of a “public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation”.42 Despite the possible overzealousness of one Court 
of Protection judge in BP v Surrey County Council & Anor,43 such a derogation did not 
occur and now looks unlikely.  
The upshot is that the 2020 Act’s safeguarding of Convention rights may not 
provide much comfort to older and disabled people worried about maintaining their 
dignity at the present time. Among other things, this demonstrates the limitations of the 
ECHR in the context of more social rights, despite its enforceability by individuals at 
national level. The 2020 Act does leave intact the Care Act’s section 1 “well-being” 
principle, which provides that “[t]he general duty of a local authority, in exercising a 
function under [Part 1 of the Care Act] in the case of an individual, is to promote that 
individual’s well-being”.44 Even at the time the 2014 Act was being implemented, 
however, the Government admitted that the principle was not designed to require a local 
authority to “undertake any particular action in … itself”.45 In addition, one of the ways 
in which the principle was invoked before the 2020 Act was as part of the needs 
assessment duty,46 which the Act disapplies in addition to the national eligibility 
threshold. So precious little comfort is likely to be gained from that principle either.  
 
The Welsh Approach 
 
It is noteworthy that the Welsh provisions in schedule 12 of the 2020 Act (modifying 
the Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014) do not make express reference 
	
42 European Convention on Human Rights 1950, Art.15. 
43 [2020] EWCOP 17; cf the later clarification in [2020] EWCOP 22. See S. Martin, “A Domestic Court’s 
Attempt to Derogate from the ECHR on behalf of the United Kingdom: the implications of Covid-19 on 
judicial decision-making in the United Kingdom”, EJIL:Talk!, 9 April 2020, available at 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-domestic-courts-attempt-to-derogate-from-the-echr-on-behalf-of-the-united-
kingdom-the-implications-of-covid-19-on-judicial-decision-making-in-the-united-kingdom/ [Accessed 
24 August 2020] for discussion. 
44 Care Act 2014, s.1(1). 
45 Department of Health, Response to the Consultation on Draft Regulations and Guidance for 
Implementation of Part 1 of the Care Act 2014 (Cm 895536, 2014), p.11. 
46 Care Act 2014, s.9(4)(a). 
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to Convention rights in defining the scope of the “eased” duty to meet needs. Instead, 
they leave intact the Welsh 2014 Act’s phrasing of a duty to meet where the authority 
“considers it necessary to meet the needs in order to protect the adult from abuse or 
neglect or a risk of abuse or neglect” (albeit disapplying the usual duty to meet where 
the eligibility criteria are satisfied).47 It is not clear how much substantive difference 
this makes. Of course local authorities in Wales would be bound by the Convention in 
any event,48 so if the Welsh phrasing makes any difference it would be to provide a 
more onerous duty to meet needs. It is certainly arguable that Elaine McDonald was 
placed at risk of abuse or neglect by the state itself even though she was denied 
substantive protection under Article 8, although perhaps only Lady Hale (given her 
powerful dissent in defence of dignity in the Supreme Court) would have perceived the 
case in such terms. 
 
Paying for Care 
 
As regards the vexed issue of paying for care, an English local authority is relieved of 
its duty to carry out a financial assessment by the 2020 Act.49 But while it cannot charge 
for a service unless it carries out such an assessment, the 2020 Act expressly allows the 
authority to carry out the assessment after the so-called “emergency period” and to 
charge retrospectively for services provided during that period.50 From a practical 
perspective, this is understandable, and the whole system is predicated on the idea that 
users who can afford to pay should do so. If charging is bound to be a feature, it is 
certainly desirable to allow a local authority to meet needs first and ask whether 
someone should be charged for services later. But some users may be surprised to be 
faced with charges after the event, and giving “reasonable information in advance” 
about this (as the guidance puts it) is particularly important.51 More broadly, it is to be 	
47 Coronavirus Act 2020, sch.12, para.27, amending Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014, 
s.40. 
48 See, e.g., Welsh Government, “Adult social services during the COVID-19 pandemic: guidance”, 30 
April 2020, available at https://gov.wales/adult-social-services-during-covid-19-pandemic-html 
[Accessed 24 August 2020]. 
49 Coronavirus Act 2020, sch.12, para.3, disapplying the duties in Care Act 2014, s.17. 
50 Coronavirus Act 2020, sch.12, para.10. 
51 Department of Health & Social Care, “Care Act easements: guidance for local authorities”, Section 3. 
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hoped that the current crisis will ultimately trigger proper consideration of social care’s 
funding in the longer term. 
 
The Life-Span of the “Easements” 
 
The length of time for which the world population will be subject to emergency 
measures of all kinds, and indeed to the risk of the COVID-19 itself, is of course a key 
question at the present time. The 2020 Act attempts to provide at least a working answer 
in the context of the so-called “easements”. The basic principle in the Act is that it will 
expire two years after it is passed, leading to a presumptive expiry date of 25 March 
2022.52 That principle, however, is immediately undermined by the fact that the Act’s 
application can either be terminated early or extended for up to six months at a time by 
regulation.53 But perhaps there is no real alternative in contemporary conditions. 
 
The Significance of Guidance and Policy 
 
It is often the case that the statute book tells only part of the story of how particular 
legal provisions will operate. That is particularly true in the context of the law 
governing a system such as social care. This section of the paper therefore considers 
the significance of statutory guidance and policy, notwithstanding the legislative 
provisions discussed in the last section.  
It must be acknowledged that the present crisis involves many unknowns, and 
that extraordinarily difficult decisions will almost inevitably have to be made. The 
paper has already emphasised that the social care system was stretched before the 
pandemic arrived, and issues such as care workers needing to self-isolate or falling ill 
themselves are likely to make matters even more difficult for local authorities 
attempting to ensure the delivery of services. 
	
52 Coronavirus Act 2020, s.89(1). 
53 Coronavirus Act 2020, s.90. 
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Anecdotally, it is clear that many care workers have gone to considerable 
lengths to try to maintain a high quality of life for the people they support,54 whatever 
the Care Act 2014 or the Coronavirus Act 2020 might formally require of them. The 
Government’s statutory guidance, moreover, makes clear that local authorities “should 
do everything they can to continue meeting their existing duties prior to the Coronavirus 
Act provisions coming into force”.55 When they are unable to do so, they are urged to 
follow a structured and fully informed decision-making process before taking 
advantage of the 2020 Act’s relaxations, and there is a notification procedure for doing 
so. At one time, at least seven56 or eight57 local authorities had formally triggered the 
provisions at the time of writing, with suspicions that more were doing so informally. 
While all English local authorities had apparently ceased relying on the “easements” 
by July 2020,58 the prospect of a “second wave” means that further use of them is a 
likely prospect. 
The very purpose of the so-called “easements” is stated to be enabling local 
authorities to “streamline present assessment arrangements and prioritise care so that 
the most urgent and acute needs are met”.59 It is arguable, moreover, that a failure to 
allow local authorities the flexibility to prioritise in a context of scarce resources could 
have made matters worse by encouraging formalistic compliance at the potential 
expense of meeting substantive needs adequately. But the guidance is not 
straightforwardly binding, and the extent to which it is raises normative problems in 	
54 See, e.g., J. Murray, “‘We did what we set out to achieve’: the staff who moved into care homes”, The 
Guardian, 28 April 2020, available at https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/apr/28/we-did-what-
we-set-out-to-achieve-the-staff-who-moved-into-care-homes [Accessed 24 August 2020]. 
55 Department of Health & Social Care, “Care Act easements: guidance for local authorities”, Section 2. 
56 Professional Social Work magazine, “Call for transparency in enacting of ‘easements’ of Care Act 
duties”, 13 May 2020, available at https://www.basw.co.uk/resources/psw-magazine/psw-online/call-
transparency-enacting-easements-care-act-duties [Accessed 24 August 2020]. 
57 M. Samuel, “Eight councils have triggered Care Act duty moratorium in month since emergency law 
came into force”, Community Care, 30 April 2020, available at 
https://www.communitycare.co.uk/2020/04/30/eight-councils-triggered-care-act-duty-moratorium-
month-since-emergency-law-came-force/ [Accessed 24 August 2020]. 
58 M. Samuel, “No council left suspending Care Act duties”, Community Care, 6 July 2020, available at 
https://www.communitycare.co.uk/2020/07/06/council-left-suspending-care-act-duties/ [Accessed 24 
August 2020]. 
59 Department of Health & Social Care, “Care Act easements: guidance for local authorities”, Section 2. 
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any event. There may be an attempt to ensure that guidance issued under schedule 12 
has more weight than guidance ordinarily issued under the 2014 Act. Under the 2014 
Act, a local authority “must act under the general guidance of the Secretary of State in 
the exercise of functions given to it” under relevant provisions.60 This was intended to 
have the “same legal effect” as section 7 of the Local Authority Social Services Act 
1970,61 which was judicially interpreted as requiring local authorities “to follow the 
path charted by the … guidance, with liberty to deviate from it where the local authority 
judges on admissible grounds that there is good reason to do so, but without freedom 
to take a substantially different course”.62 By apparent contrast, under schedule 12 of 
the 2020 Act, a local authority must not only “have regard to any guidance issued 
under” paragraph 18,63 but also “comply with such guidance issued under [that 
paragraph] as the Secretary of State directs”.64 This is apparently a rare turn of phrase 
in a statute applicable in England.65 For its part, the guidance does use the word “must” 
at times. But it stops short of doing so at other times, such as when describing the 
“[s]teps Local Authorities should take before exercising the Care Act easements”.66 
The 2020 Act’s essential continuance of the pattern that guidance is central to 
the social care system’s operation may have considerable implications for certainty and 
the rule of law, arguably more important than ever in the context of the current 
pandemic. The fact that some of the guidance is apparently to be considered binding 
notwithstanding its status is in principle controversial, given that it will not have been 
subject to the same parliamentary scrutiny as secondary legislation. R v Secretary of 
State for Health, ex p Pfizer (No.1) is authority for the proposition that guidance issued 
by a public authority is unlawful if it purports to impose a binding obligation not to 
comply with a legal duty.67 It would be a stretch to argue that guidance can never 
	
60 Care Act 2014, s.78(1). 
61 Explanatory Notes to the Care Act 2014, para.472. 
62 R v Islington LBC ex parte Rixon [1997] E.L.R. 66 (Q.B.), 71. 
63 Coronavirus Act 2020, sch.12, para.18(2). 
64 Coronavirus Act 2020, sch.12, para.18(3). 
65 Cf, e.g. Regulatory Reform (Scotland) Act 2014, s.31.  
66 Department of Health & Social Care, “Care Act easements: guidance for local authorities”, Section 6 
(emphasis added). 
67 [1999] Lloyds Rep. Med. 289. 
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therefore be binding,68 particularly if the statute under which it is issued expressly 
contemplates that some of it will have that character. But the controversy about an 
absence of scrutiny remains. 
Whatever the rights and wrongs of the policy surrounding the Care Act 
“easements” and the mechanisms through which it has been implemented, it is 
necessary to keep a watchful eye on express legal limits that the state imposes on its 
duties to meet the needs, and ensure the dignity, of members of society who need 
support in order to lead fulfilled lives. This is true however much uncertainty there is 
about the proper role of the state in providing and facilitating care.69 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has shown inter alia that the Coronavirus Act 2020 has made potentially 
significant (albeit ostensibly temporary) changes to social care law, but that much of its 
effect in practice will be determined by guidance that is not straightforwardly binding, 
or conversely is controversially binding to some extent. The paper has also shown that, 
despite the 2020 Act’s reliance on Convention rights, rights such as those under Article 
8 are of limited utility in the context of a social care system controlled by public bodies 
in a particular contracting party. 
Coronavirus or not, it is easy to be bleak about social care’s future. But perhaps 
there is a chance that, analogously with the National Health Service, the present crisis 
will cause society to realise that social care needs to be adequately and fairly funded, 
and both its users and its workers properly valued. This would be consistent with 
Jonathan Herring’s argument that “caring … should be seen as a central value and 
practice for any state”.70 Such aspirations, however, still appear to be some way from 
being realised. 
 
 
	68	See, e.g., R (on the application of W) v Secretary of State for Health [2015] EWCA Civ 1034; 
[2016] 1 W.L.R. 698.	
69 See, e.g., Sloan, “The ‘Social Contract’, Care and Inheritance in England and Hong Kong”. 
70 J. Herring, Caring and the Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013), pp.101-102. 
